Interpretation Response #PI-81-018 ([The Public Service Commission] [James S. Stites])

Below is the interpretation response detail and a list of regulations sections applicable to this response.

Interpretation Response Details

Response Publish Date: 10/07/1981

Company Name: The Public Service Commission

Individual Name: James S. Stites

Location State: SC Country: US

View the Interpretation Document

Response text:

Mr. James S. Stites

Chief, Gas Department

Utilities Division

The Public Service Commission

P.O. Drawer 11649

111 Doctors Circle

Columbia, South Carolina 29211

Dear Mr. Stites:

The enclosed interpretation is in response to your letter of September 10, 1981, regarding compliance with 49 CFR 192.727(d) when a service line stop valve is closed by someone other
than the operator.

Sincerely,

Melvin A. Judah

Acting Associate Director for Pipeline Safety Regulation

Materials Transportation Bureau

Enclosure

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

RESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION

MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION BUREAU

PIPELINE SAFETY REGULATORY INTERPRETATION

Note: A pipeline safety regulatory interpretation applies a particular rule to a particular set of facts and circumstances, and, as such, may be relied upon only by those persons to whom the interpretation is specifically addressed.

SECTION: 192.727(d)

SUBJECT: Inactivated service line

FACTS: The stop valve at a customer meter is closed by the customer or by someone other than the operator. The operator is not told of the closing or requested to discontinue service, but discovers at a later date that the valve is closed.

QUESTION: After discovering the closed valve, does the operator have to meet the requirements of §192.727(d) regarding a discontinued service?

INTERPRETATION: Section 192.727(d) prescribes precautionary steps an operator must take "whenever service to a customer is discontinued." This regulation was established by Amendment 192-8 (37 FR 20695, October 3, 1972) to prevent accidents caused by the unauthorized reactivation of service lines that are not currently being used to provided gas service. As the regulation indicates, the potential for such accidents arises when the delivery of gas to a customer is discontinued. The potential is the same whether discontinuance results from an action by the operator or by someone else. Thus, under the facts stated above, the operator would have to comply with §192.727(d) if the closed stop valve represented a discontinuance of service, even though the valve was closed without the operator's knowledge. Whether the closed valve amounted to a discontinuance of service, and not just a prank or temporary closure for some purpose other than termination of service to the customer, would depend on fats that should have been ascertained by the operator after discovering the closed valve.

Melvin A. Judah

Acting Associate Director for

Pipeline Safety Regulation

Regulation Sections