



Gas Transmission Asset and Integrity Management



Risk Model

Presentation

Cindy Anslinger Jarrett Compton

transmission integrity management



Vectren's Gas Footprint

Vectren Energy Delivery of Indiana – South

 111,000 gas customers
 142 miles of transmission

Vectren Energy Delivery of Indiana – North


 580,000 gas customers
 652 miles of transmission

Vectren Energy Delivery of Ohio

 314,000 gas customers
 212 miles of transmission


Vectren Storage Fields

8 Storage Field Locations





Vectren Risk Model History



- **2004:** Engaged Centerpoint Energy as a consultant to help in the development of relative risk ranking model. Subsequently used Sewall RiskCalculator[™] to identify top 50% risk ranked pipelines.
- **2007:** Adopted SmallWorld[™] GIS system with a custom algorithm for automated Class and HCA identification. Also switched to Method 2 for HCA identification. The GIS system could not provide data transfer to Risk Calculator which necessitated the move to an SME style risk model with input from RiskCalculator[™].
- **2011:** Following the annual review of the Integrity Management Plan, a philosophy change in risk assessment resulted in the evaluation of several pipeline risk software packages. GeoFields RiskFrame[®] Modeler was chosen to evaluate risk and RiskFrame[®] HCA to evaluate Class and HCA.




Goals of Risk Process

- Provide Management with easily understandable view of overall system risk.
- Provide Integrity Management Project Team with actionable information.
- Demonstrate effect on pipeline risk as a direct result of assessments and modernization project work.
- Demonstrate that the risk model reflects reported incidents as well as local operations observations on local pipeline risk.
- Provide Project Team with assessment options through scenarios.



Risk Model Review Process






Risk Scoring Process

Risk Score:

Weighted relative index score based on pipe parameters and surroundings





Risk Model Equations

Risk of Failure (ROF)

ROF= Likelihood of Failure * Consequence of Failure



Risk Model Equations

Likelihood of Failure = (10*TPD + 7*MFG + 5*IO + 5*WOF + 7*CONS + 3*DS + 6*EQ + 9*EC + 1*IC + 1*SCC + 5*IAT)/59

- TPD \rightarrow Third Party Damage
- MFG \rightarrow Manufacturing
- IO \rightarrow Incorrect Operations
- WOF \rightarrow Weather and Outside Forces
- CONS \rightarrow Construction
- DS \rightarrow Design
- EQ \rightarrow Equipment
- EC \rightarrow External Corrosion
- IC \rightarrow Internal Corrosion
- SCC \rightarrow Stress Corrosion Cracking
- IAT \rightarrow Interactive Threats

ASME B31.8S Threat Categories



Risk Model Equations

Consequence of Failure = (7*COB + 1*COE + 10*COP)/18

- $COB \rightarrow Consequence \text{ on Business}$
 - 1. Customers out of Service
 - 2. Loss of Product
- $COE \rightarrow Consequence on Environment$
 - 1. Environmentally Sensitive Areas
- $COP \rightarrow Consequence on Population$
 - 1. Potential harm to people and/or property near pipeline



Range of Risk Scores

Risk of Failure

 $1 \rightarrow \text{Lowest Risk}$ $100 \rightarrow \text{Highest Risk}$

Consequence, Likelihood, and Inputs

 $1 \rightarrow \text{Lowest Risk}$ $10 \rightarrow \text{Highest Risk}$



Transmission Risk Inputs

- Consequence MAOP
- Consequence Nominal
 Diameter
- Single Feed Locations
- DOT Class Environment
- HCA Gas Constant
- Nominal Diameter
- Wall Thickness
- Depth of Cover
- Construction Inspection
- Construction Material
- Pressure Test
- Joint Inspection
- Wrinkle Bends
- Weld Method
 - Current Year
 - Install Date
- Earthquake Zones
- Land Slides
- Safety Systems
- AC Interference
- Bell Hole Inspection
- Roads
- Blasting Zones
- Exposures

- Cathodic Protection
- External Coating
- External Metal Loss
- Microbiological Induced Corrosion
- Bell Hole Soil pH
- Soil Resistivity
- Coating Condition
- Equipment Failure
- Age Failure
- O Ring Failure
- Regulator Failure
- Relief Valve
- Main Line Valves
- Remote and Non Remote-Controlled
 Main Line Valves
- Carbon Dioxide Content Level
- Corrosion Detection Devices
- Hydrogen Sulfide Content Level
- Internal Metal Loss
- Oxygen Content Level
- Single Family Home Density
- Encroachment Area
- High Occupancy Location
- Incorrect Operations Failures/Near Miss


- Internal Corrosion
- Water Content Level
- Storage Field
- Emergency Response Training
- Audit Findings IM, O&M
- Operations and Training
- Pressure Control System
- Program/Procedure Review
- SCADA
- Pipe Material
- Pipe Manufacturer
- Seam Type
- Foreign Line Crossing
 - Leaks

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- Line Markers
- Mechanical Damage
- One-Call
- Public Awareness Program
- Patrol Frequency
- Patrol Type
- Previous Third-Party Damage
- River Crossing
- River Weights
- Frost Line
- Flood Zones



Dynamic Segmentation



Breaks the route at every attribute change creating a new risk segment




Accounting for Assessments

Threats that can be mitigated by assessment get reduced by a diminishing factor. Example: External Corrosion

ECscore

ECmaxEffective*(()InstallDateScoreEC)+(8*ExternalCoatingScoreEC)+(10*ExtCoatCondScore)+(8*ExtMLFormulaScore)+(7*WallThicknessScoreEC)+ = (4*NomDiaSecreEC)+(5*PctSMYSscoreEC)+(2*ECPAlogicScore)+(1*EffectiveCPFactorScore)+(9*BellHolelECPresentScore)+(5*MICPresentScore)+ (5*SoilpHScoreEC)+(8*SoilResistivityFormula)+(8*ACInterferenceScore))/87




While Threats that cannot mitigated by assessment are not reduced. Example: Design

DSscore = ((10*PipeStrengthScore)+(0*SafetySystemsScore)+(5*DesignClassYear)*(1*PiggableScore))/16




Risk Model Results






Risk Model Results





Risk Model Results






Sensitivity Study


→ Look at how changing one factor affects the risk score

Top 20





Model Validation




PHMSA All Reported Incident Cause Breakdown 20 Year Average (1997-2016)

Vectren Risk Model Threat Weightings



Model Validation


The results are also presented to local operations to solicit feedback as to the relative risk of the pipelines in the operations center.





Scenarios

Scenarios allow for the simulation of assessment activity to study the effect on risk by changing an attribute value or group of values.



This particular pipeline has a moderate risk score due to construction threats. The pipeline has the installation pressure test from 1971.

We can run a scenario to determine the effect or the risk score by simulating a new qualifying hydrotest.

For the hydrotest scenario, we have reviewed what threats would be affected and when the model is ran it will tell you how it will affect risk.



Scenarios

Scenarios allow for the simulation of assessment activity to study the effect on risk by changing an attribute value or group of values.

Below is shown the result of performing a pressure test on a pipeline.

Route_Name	Begin_Measure	End_Measure	SegLength	ROF	LOFscore	COFscore	SCCscore	COBscore	COEscore	COPscore	CONSscore	DSscore	EQscore	ECscore	ICscore	MFGscore	TPDscore	WOFscore	IncOpsScore	Create_Date
NE4006	0.00	7.07	7.07	13.39	4.07	3.29	0.86	2.91	1.00	3.78	7.08	16.25	0.41	3.39	3.56	5.67	1.85	1.92	4.33	5/11/2017
NE4006	0.00	7.07	7.07	9.57	2 91	3.29	1.00	2 91	1.00	2 78	4.95	16.25	0.41	2 3 7	2 49	3.97	0.55	0.19	4 33	5/25/2017
NE4006	7.07	104.97	97.90	13.09	3.98	3.29	0.86	2.91	1.00	3.78	6.31	16.25	0.41	3.39	3.56	5.67	1.85	1.92	4.33	5/11/2017
NE4006	7.07	104.97	97.90	9.38	2.85	3.29	1.00	2.91	1.00	3.78	4.42	16.25	0.41	2.37	2.49	3.97	0.55	0.19	4.33	5/25/2017
NE4006	104.97	131.65	26.68	13.65	4.15	3.29	0.86	2.91	1.00	3.78	6.31	16.25	0.41	3.39	3.56	5.67	2.87	1.92	4.33	5/11/2017
NE4006	104.97	131.65	26.68	9.48	2.88	3.29	1.00	2.91	1.00	3.78	4.42	16.25	0.41	2.37	2.49	3.97	0.76	0.19	4.33	5/25/2017
									DO	3.78	6.31	16.25	0.41	3.39	3.56	5.67	1.38	1.92	4.33	5/11/2017
	Tn thi		~ +	ho	ro ic) E 0/	'	DO	3.78	4.42	16.25	0.41	2.37	2.49	3.97	0.46	0.19	4.33	5/25/2017
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									DO	3.78	4.42	16.25	0.41	2.37	2.49	3.97	0.54	0.19	4.33	5/25/2017
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	-		-	-					00	3.78	4.42	16.25	0.41	2.37	2.49	3.97	0.46	0.19	4.33	5/25/2017
NE4006	828.04	997.96	169.92	13.06	3.97	3.29	0.86	2.91	1.00	3.78	6.31	16.25	0.41	3.39	3.56	5.67	1.77	1.92	4.33	5/11/2017
NE4006	828.04	997.96	169.92	9.34	2.84	3.29	1.00	2.91	1.00	3.78	4.42	16.25	0.41	2.37	2.49	3.97	0.54	0.19	4.33	5/25/2017
NE4006	997.96	1257.63	259.67	12.96	3.94	3.29	0.86	2.91	1.00	3.78	6.31	16.25	0.41	3.39	3.56	5.67	1.62	1.92	4.33	5/11/2017
NE4006	997.96	1257.63	259.67	9,34	2.84	3.29	1.00	2.91	1.00	3.78	4.42	16.25	0.41	2.37	2.49	3.97	0.51	0.19	4.33	5/25/2017
NE4006	1257.63	1439.62	181.99	13.06	3.97	3.29	0.86	2.91	1.00	3.78	6.31	16.25	0.41	3.39	3.56	5.67	1.77	1.92	4.33	5/11/2017
NE4006	1257.63	1439.62	181.99	9.34	2.84	3.29	1.00	2.91	1.00	3.78	4.42	16.25	0.41	2.37	2.49	3.97	0.54	0.19	4.33	5/25/2017
NE4006	1439.62	1446.69	7.07	12.77	3.88	3.29	0.86	2.91	1.00	3.78	6.31	16.25	0.41	3.39	3.56	5.67	1.26	1.92	4.33	5/11/2017
NE4006	1439.62	1446.69	7.07	9.31	2.83	3.29	1.00	2.91	1.00	3.78	4.42	16.25	0.41	2.37	2.49	3.97	0.44	0.19	4.33	5/25/2017
NE4006	1446.69	1494.65	47.96	12.53	3.81	3.29	0.86	2.91	1.00	3.78	5.69	16.25	0.41	3.39	3.56	5.67	1.26	1.92	4.33	5/11/2017
NE4006	1446.69	1494.65	47.96	9.11	2.77	3.29	1.00	2.91	1.00	3.78	3.98	16.25	0.41	2.37	2.49	3.97	0.44	0.19	4.33	5/25/2017
NE4006	1494.65	2270.96	776.31	12.83	3.90	3.29	0.86	2.91	1.00	3.78	6.31	16.25	0.41	3.39	3.56	5.67	1.38	1.92	4.33	5/11/2017
NE4006	1494.65	2270.96	776.31	9.31	2.83	3.29	1.00	2.91	1.00	3.78	4.42	16.25	0.41	2.37	2.49	3.97	0.46	0.19	4.33	5/25/2017
NE4006	2270.96	3568.83	1297.87	13.06	3.97	3.29	0.86	2.91	1.00	3.78	6.31	16.25	0.41	3.39	3.56	5.67	1.77	1.92	4.33	5/11/2017
NE4006	2270.96	3568.83	1297.87	9.34	2.84	3.29	1.00	2.91	1.00	3.78	4.42	16.25	0.41	2.37	2.49	3.97	0.54	0.19	4.33	5/25/2017
NE4006	3568.83	3663.14	94.31	12.83	3.90	3.29	0.86	2.91	1.00	3.78	6.31	16.25	0.41	3.39	3.56	5.67	1.38	1.92	4.33	5/11/2017
NE4006	3568.83	3663.14	94.31	9.31	2.83	3.29	1.00	2.91	1.00	3.78	4.42	16.25	0.41	2.37	2.49	3.97	0.46	0.19	4.33	5/25/2017
NE4006	3663.14	3705.15	42.01	13.39	4.07	3.29	0.86	2.91	1.00	3.78	6.31	16.25	0.41	3.39	3.56	5.67	2.41	1.92	4.33	5/11/2017
NE4006	3663.14	3705.15	42.01	9.44	2.87	3.29	1.00	2.91	1.00	3.78	4.42	16.25	0.41	2.37	2.49	3.97	0.67	0.19	4.33	5/25/2017
NE4006	3705.15	4446.36	741.21	12.83	3.90	3.29	0.86	2.91	1.00	3.78	6.31	16.25	0.41	3.39	3.56	5.67	1.38	1.92	4.33	5/11/2017
NE4006	3705.15	4446.36	741.21	9.31	2.83	3.29	1.00	2.91	1.00	3.78	4.42	16.25	0.41	2.37	2.49	3.97	0.46	0.19	4.33	5/25/2017
NE4006	4446.36	4505.54	59.18	13.39	4.07	3.29	0.86	2.91	1.00	3.78	6.31	16.25	0.41	3.39	3.56	5.67	2.41	1.92	4.33	5/11/2017
NE4006	4446.36	4505.54	59.18	9.44	2.87	3.29	1.00	2.91	1.00	3.78	4.42	16.25	0.41	2.37	2.49	3.97	0.67	0.19	4.33	5/25/2017
NE4006	4505.54	4556.15	50.61	12.83	3.90	3.29	0.86	2.91	1.00	3.78	6.31	16.25	0.41	3.39	3.56	5.67	1.38	1.92	4.33	5/11/2017
NE4006	4505.54	4556.15	50.61	9.31	2.83	3.29	1.00	2.91	1.00	3.78	4.42	16.25	0.41	2.37	2.49	3.97	0.46	0.19	4.33	5/25/2017
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Missing Inputs and Nulls

- Missing and Null Value data are handled on an individual basis
- Where practical, conservative values are used to assess risk in pipe segments with missing data
- Missing data that is deemed vital to the safe operation of the system is actively collected
 - Pipe grade and Wall Thickness
 - 667 pipe segment analyzed
 - 2,315 Specimens Tested
 - Documented Test Pressure
 - All HCA gaps remediated by end of 2016
 - All Transmission gaps remediated by end of 2020



Wins

- Standardized scoring makes explaining the model and the results easier.
- Visual output has been effective in demonstrating reasoning for project prioritization.
- Annual reviews have received good participation.



Lessons Learned

- The ROF=LOF * COF format over emphasizes the consequence portion which is generally static and difficult to influence.
- Large number of risk segments makes prioritizing individual segments difficult.
- Need to account for cost of remediation activities outside of the risk model for project prioritization.




Continuing Improvements

- Prioritizing activities based on likelihood scores which are more directly affected by field work.
- Modifying model to better show how remediation and assessment lowers risk.
- Modifying model to better utilize the risk range.
- Modifying the system for improved views aligned with the role of the person



Transmission GIS Dashboard





Questions?

