Implementing Integrity Management - Final Rule (as amended)
July 17, 2007

Integrity Management for Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Operators

High Consequence Areas
§ 195.450 Definitions.
The following definitions apply to this section and § 195.452:
Emergency flow restricting device or EFRD means a check valve or remote control valve as follows:
(1) Check valve means a valve that permits fluid to flow freely in one direction and contains a mechanism to automatically prevent flow in the other direction.
(2) Remote control valve or RCV means any valve that is operated from a location remote from where the valve is installed. The RCV is usually operated by the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. The linkage between the pipeline control center and the RCV may be by fiber optics, microwave, telephone lines, or satellite.
High consequence area means:
(1) A commercially navigable waterway, which means a waterway where a substantial likelihood of commercial navigation exists;
(2) A high population area, which means an urbanized area, as defined and delineated by the Census Bureau, that contains 50,000 or more people and has a population density of at least 1,000 people per square mile;
(3) An other populated area, which means a place, as defined and delineated by the Census Bureau, that contains a concentrated population, such as an incorporated or unincorporated city, town, village, or other designated residential or commercial area;
(4) An unusually sensitive area, as defined in § 195.6.

Pipeline Integrity Management
§ 195.452 Pipeline integrity management in high consequence areas.

(a) Which pipelines are covered by this section? This section applies to each hazardous liquid pipeline and carbon dioxide pipeline that could affect a high consequence area, including any pipeline located in a high consequence area unless the operator effectively demonstrates by risk assessment that the pipeline could not affect the area. (Appendix C of this part provides guidance on determining if a pipeline could affect a high consequence area.) Covered pipelines are categorized as follows:
(1) Category 1 includes pipelines existing on May 29, 2001, that were owned or operated by an operator who owned or operated a total of 500 or more miles of pipeline subject to this part.
(2) Category 2 includes pipelines existing on May 29, 2001, that were owned or operated by an operator who owned or operated less than 500 miles of pipeline subject to this part.
(3) Category 3 includes pipelines constructed or converted after May 29, 2001.
(b) What program and practices must operators use to manage pipeline integrity? Each operator of a pipeline covered by this section must:
(1) Develop a written integrity management program that addresses the risks on each segment of pipeline in the first column of the following table not later than the date in the second column:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pipeline</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category 1 ....</td>
<td>December 31, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category 2 ....</td>
<td>November 18, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category 3 ....</td>
<td>Date the pipeline begins operation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Include in the program a plan to carry out baseline assessments of line pipe as required by paragraph (c) of this section.
(4) Include in the program a framework that-
(i) Addresses each element of the integrity management program under paragraph (f) of this section, including continual integrity assessment and evaluation under paragraph (j) of this section; and
(ii) Initially indicates how decisions will be made to implement each element.
(5) Implement and follow the program.
(6) Follow recognized industry practices in carrying out this section, unless-
(i) This section specifies otherwise; or
(ii) The operator demonstrates that an alternative practice is supported by a reliable engineering evaluation and provides an equivalent level of public safety and environmental protection.
(c) What must be in the baseline assessment plan? (1) An operator must include each of the following elements in its written baseline assessment plan:
(i) The methods selected to assess the integrity of the line pipe. An operator must assess the integrity of the line pipe by any of the following methods. The methods an operator selects to assess low frequency electric resistance welded pipe or lap welded pipe susceptible to longitudinal seam failure must be capable of assessing seam integrity and of detecting corrosion and deformation anomalies.
**Integrity Management for Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Operators**

(A) Internal inspection tool or tools capable of detecting corrosion and deformation anomalies including dents, gouges and grooves;
(B) Pressure test conducted in accordance with subpart E of this part;
(C) External corrosion direct assessment in accordance with § 195.588; or
(D) Other technology that the operator demonstrates can provide an equivalent understanding of the condition of the line pipe. An operator choosing this option must notify the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) 90 days before conducting the assessment, by sending a notice to the address or facsimile number specified in paragraph (m) of this section.

(ii) A schedule for completing the integrity assessment;
(iii) An explanation of the assessment methods selected and evaluation of risk factors considered in establishing the assessment schedule.

(3) Newly-identified areas. (i) When information is available from the information analysis (see paragraph (g) of this section), or from Census Bureau maps, that the population density around a pipeline segment has changed so as to fall within the definition in § 195.450 of a high population area or other populated area, the operator must incorporate the area into its baseline assessment plan as a high consequence area within one year from the date the area is identified. An operator must complete the baseline assessment of any line pipe that could affect the newly-identified high consequence area within five years from the date the area is identified.

(ii) An operator must incorporate a new unusually sensitive area into its baseline assessment plan within one year from the date the area is identified. An operator must complete the baseline assessment of any line pipe that could affect the newly-identified high consequence area within five years from the date the area is identified.

(e) What are the risk factors for establishing an assessment schedule (for both the baseline and continual integrity assessments)?
(1) An operator must establish an integrity assessment schedule that prioritizes pipeline segments for assessment (see paragraphs (d)(1) and (j)(3) of this section). An operator must base the assessment schedule on all risk factors that reflect the risk conditions on the pipeline segment. The factors an operator must consider include, but are not limited to:

(i) Results of the previous integrity assessment, defect type and size that the assessment method can detect, and defect growth rate;

(ii) Pipe size, material, manufacturing information, coating type and condition, and seam type;

(iii) Leak history, repair history and cathodic protection history;

(iv) Product transported;

(v) Operating stress level;

(vi) Existing or projected activities in the area;

(vii) Local environmental factors that could affect the pipeline (e.g., corrosivity of soil, subsidence, climatic);

(viii) Geo-technical hazards; and

(ix) Physical support of the segment such as by a cable suspension bridge.

(f) What are the elements of an integrity management program? An integrity management program begins with the initial framework. An operator must continually change the program to reflect operating experience, conclusions drawn from results of the integrity assessments, and other maintenance and surveillance data, and evaluation of consequences of a failure on the high consequence area. An operator must include, at minimum, each of the following

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If the pipeline is:</th>
<th>Then complete baseline assessments not later than the following date according to a schedule that prioritizes assessments:</th>
<th>And assess at least 50 percent of the line pipe on an expedited basis, beginning with the highest risk pipe, not later than:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category 1 ..........</td>
<td>March 31, 2008</td>
<td>September 30, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category 2 ..........</td>
<td>February 17, 2009</td>
<td>August 16, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category 3 ..........</td>
<td>Date the pipeline begins operation</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Prior assessment. To satisfy the requirements of paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section for pipelines in the first column of the following table, operators may use integrity assessments conducted after the date in the second column, if the integrity assessment method complies with this section. However, if an operator uses this prior assessment as its baseline assessment, the operator must reassess the line pipe according to paragraph (j)(3) of this section. The table follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pipeline</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category 1 ....</td>
<td>January 1, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category 2 ....</td>
<td>February 15, 1997</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
elements in its written integrity management program:
(1) A process for identifying which pipeline segments could affect a high consequence area;
(2) A baseline assessment plan meeting the requirements of paragraph (c) of this section;
(3) An analysis that integrates all available information about the integrity of the entire pipeline and the consequences of a failure (see paragraph (g) of this section);
(4) Criteria for remedial actions to address integrity issues raised by the assessment methods and information analysis (see paragraph (h)(2) of this section);
(5) A continual process of assessment and evaluation to maintain a pipeline’s integrity (see paragraph (j) of this section);
(6) Identification of preventive and mitigative measures to protect the high consequence area (see paragraph (i) of this section);
(7) Methods to measure the program’s effectiveness (see paragraph (k) of this section);
(8) A process for review of integrity assessment results and information analysis by a person qualified to evaluate the results and information (see paragraph (h)(2) of this section).

(g) What is an information analysis? In periodically evaluating the integrity of each pipeline segment (paragraph (j) of this section), an operator must analyze all available information about the integrity of the entire pipeline and the consequences of a failure. This information includes:
(1) Information critical to determining the potential for, and preventing, damage due to excavation, including current and planned damage prevention activities, and development or planned development along the pipeline segment;
(2) Data gathered through the integrity assessment required under this section;
(3) Data gathered in conjunction with other inspections, tests, surveillance and patrols required by this Part, including, corrosion control monitoring and cathodic protection surveys; and
(4) Information about how a failure would affect the high consequence area, such as location of the water intake.

(h) What actions must an operator take to address integrity issues?
(1) General requirements. An operator must take prompt action to address all anomalous conditions the operator discovers through the integrity assessment or information analysis. In addressing all conditions, an operator must evaluate all anomalous conditions and remediate those that could reduce a pipeline’s integrity. An operator must be able to demonstrate that the remediation of the condition will ensure the condition is unlikely to pose a threat to the long-term integrity of the pipeline. An operator must comply with §195.422 when making a repair.

(i) Temporary pressure reduction. An operator must notify PHMSA, in accordance with paragraph (m) of this section, if the operator cannot meet the schedule for evaluation and remediation required under paragraph (h)(3) of this section and cannot provide safety through a temporary reduction in operating pressure.

(ii) Long-term pressure reduction. When a pressure reduction exceeds 365 days, the operator must notify PHMSA in accordance with paragraph (m) of this section and explain the reasons for the delay. An operator must also take further remedial action to ensure the safety of the pipeline.

(2) Discovery of a condition.

Discovery of a condition occurs when an operator has adequate information about the condition to determine that the condition presents a potential threat to the integrity of the pipeline. An operator must promptly, but no later than 180 days after an integrity assessment, obtain sufficient information about a condition to make that determination, unless the operator can demonstrate that the 180-day period is impracticable.

(3) Schedule for evaluation and remediation. An operator must complete remediation of a condition according to a schedule prioritizing the conditions for evaluation and remediation. If an operator cannot meet the schedule for any condition, the operator must explain the reasons why it cannot meet the schedule and how the changed schedule will not jeopardize public safety or environmental protection.

(4) Special requirements for scheduling remediation

(i) Immediate repair conditions. An operator’s evaluation and remediation schedule must provide for immediate repair conditions. To maintain safety, an operator must temporarily reduce the operating pressure or shut down the pipeline until the operator completes the repair of these conditions. An operator must calculate the temporary reduction in operating pressure using the formula in section 451.7 of ASME/ANSI B31.4 (incorporated by reference, see §195.3), if applicable. If the formula is not applicable to the type of anomaly or would produce a higher operating pressure, an operator must use an alternative acceptable method to calculate a reduced operating pressure. An operator must treat the following conditions as immediate repair conditions:

(A) Metal loss greater than 80% of nominal wall regardless of dimensions.

(B) A calculation of the remaining strength of the pipe shows a predicted burst pressure less than the established maximum operating pressure at the location of the anomaly. Suitable remaining strength calculation methods include, but are not limited to, ASME/ANSI B31G (“Manual for Determining the Remaining Strength of Corroded Pipelines” (1991) or AGA Pipeline Research Committee Project PR-3-805 (“A Modified Criterion for Evaluating the Remaining Strength of Corroded Pipe” (December 1989)). These documents are incorporated by reference and are available at the addresses listed in §195.3.
(C) A dent located on the top of the pipeline (above the 4 and 8 o'clock positions) that has any indication of metal loss, cracking or a stress riser.

(D) A dent located on the top of the pipeline (above the 4 and 8 o'clock positions) with a depth greater than 6% of the nominal pipe diameter.

(E) An anomaly that in the judgment of the person designated by the operator to evaluate the assessment results requires immediate action.

(ii) 60-day conditions. Except for conditions listed in paragraph (h)(4)(i) of this section, an operator must schedule evaluation and remediation of the following conditions within 60 days of discovery of condition.

(A) A dent located on the top of the pipeline (above the 4 and 8 o'clock positions) with a depth greater than 3% of the pipeline diameter (greater than 0.250 inches in depth for a pipeline diameter less than Nominal Pipe Size (NPS) 12).

(B) A dent located on the bottom of the pipeline that has any indication of metal loss, cracking or a stress riser.

(iii) 180-day conditions. Except for conditions listed in paragraph (h)(4)(i) or (ii) of this section, an operator must schedule evaluation and remediation of the following within 180 days of discovery of the condition:

(A) A dent with a depth greater than 2% of the pipeline's diameter (0.250 inches in depth for a pipeline diameter less than NPS 12) that affects pipe curvature at a girth weld or a longitudinal seam weld.

(B) A dent located on the top of the pipeline (above 4 and 8 o'clock position) with a depth greater than 2% of the pipeline's diameter (0.250 inches in depth for a pipeline diameter less than NPS 12).

(C) A dent located on the bottom of the pipeline with a depth greater than 6% of the pipeline's diameter.

(D) A calculation of the remaining strength of the pipe shows an operating pressure at the location of the anomaly. Suitable remaining strength calculation methods include, but are not limited to, ASME/ANSI B31G (“Manual for Determining the Remaining Strength of Corroded Pipelines” (1991)) or AGA Pipeline Research Committee Project PR- 3- 805 (“A Modified Criterion for Evaluating the Remaining Strength of Corroded Pipe” (December 1989)). These documents are incorporated by reference and are available at the addresses listed in § 195.3.

(E) An area of general corrosion with a predicted metal loss greater than 50% of nominal wall.

(F) Predicted metal loss greater than 50% of nominal wall that is located at a crossing of another pipeline, or is in an area with widespread circumferential corrosion, or is in an area that could affect a girth weld.

(G) A potential crack indication that when excavated is determined to be a crack.

(H) Corrosion of or along a longitudinal seam weld.

(I) A gouge or groove greater than 12.5% of nominal wall.

(iv) Other conditions. In addition to the conditions listed in paragraphs (h)(4)(i) through (iii) of this section, an operator must evaluate any condition identified by an integrity assessment or information analysis that could impair the integrity of the pipeline, and as appropriate, schedule the condition for remediation. Appendix C of this part contains guidance concerning other conditions that an operator should evaluate.

(i) What preventive and mitigative measures must an operator take to protect the high consequence area?

(1) General requirements. An operator must take measures to prevent and mitigate the consequences of a pipeline failure that could affect a high consequence area. These measures include conducting a risk analysis of the pipeline segment to identify additional actions to enhance public safety or environmental protection. Such actions may include, but are not limited to, implementing damage prevention best practices, better monitoring of cathodic protection where corrosion is a concern, establishing shorter inspection intervals, installing EFRDs on the pipeline segment, modifying the systems that monitor pressure and detect leaks, providing additional training to personnel on response procedures, conducting drills with local emergency responders and adopting other management controls.

(2) Risk analysis criteria. In identifying the need for additional preventive and mitigative measures, an operator must evaluate the likelihood of a pipeline release occurring and how a release could affect the high consequence area. This determination must consider all relevant risk factors, including, but not limited to:

(i) Terrain surrounding the pipeline segment, including drainage systems such as small streams and other smaller waterways that could act as a conduit to the high consequence area;

(ii) Elevation profile;

(iii) Characteristics of the product transported;

(iv) Amount of product that could be released;

(v) Possibility of a spillage in a farm field following the drain tile into a waterway;

(vi) Ditches along side a roadway the pipeline crosses;

(vii) Physical support of the pipeline segment such as by a cable suspension bridge;

(viii) Exposure of the pipeline to operating pressure exceeding established maximum operating pressure.

(3) Leak detection. An operator must have a means to detect leaks on its pipeline system. An operator must evaluate the capability of its leak detection means and modify, as necessary, to protect the high consequence area. An operator's evaluation must, at least, consider, the following factors—length and size of the pipeline, type of product carried, the pipeline's proximity to the high consequence area, the swiftness of leak detection, location
of nearest response personnel, leak history, and risk assessment results.

(4) Emergency Flow Restricting Devices (EFRD). If an operator determines that an EFRD is needed on a pipeline segment to protect a high consequence area in the event of a hazardous liquid pipeline release, an operator must install the EFRD. In making this determination, an operator must, at least, consider the following factors—

the swiftness of leak detection and pipeline shutdown capabilities, the type of commodity carried, the rate of potential leakage, the volume that can be released, topography or pipeline profile, the potential for ignition, proximity to power sources, location of nearest response personnel, specific terrain between the pipeline segment and the high consequence area, and benefits expected by reducing the spill size.

(j) What is a continual process of evaluation and assessment to maintain a pipeline’s integrity?

(1) General. After completing the baseline integrity assessment, an operator must continue to assess the line pipe at specified intervals and periodically evaluate the integrity of each pipeline segment that could affect a high consequence area.

(2) Evaluation. An operator must conduct a periodic evaluation as frequently as needed to assure pipeline integrity. An operator must base the frequency of evaluation on risk factors specific to its pipeline, including the factors specified in paragraph (e) of this section. The evaluation must consider the results of the baseline and periodic integrity assessments, information analysis (paragraph (g) of this section), and decisions about remediation, and preventive and mitigative actions (paragraphs (h) and (i) of this section).

(3) Assessment intervals. An operator must establish five-year intervals, not to exceed 68 months, for continually assessing the line pipe’s integrity. An operator must base the assessment intervals on the risk the line pipe poses to the high consequence area to determine the priority for assessing the pipeline segments. An operator must establish the assessment intervals based on the factors specified in paragraph (e) of this section, the analysis of the results from the last integrity assessment, and the information analysis required by paragraph (g) of this section.

(4) Variance from the 5-year intervals in limited situations-

(i) Engineering basis. An operator may be able to justify an engineering basis for a longer assessment interval on a segment of line pipe. The justification must be supported by a reliable engineering evaluation combined with the use of other technology, such as external monitoring technology, that provides an understanding of the condition of the line pipe equivalent to that which can be obtained from the assessment methods allowed in paragraph (j)(5) of this section. An operator must notify OPS 270 days before the end of the five-year (or less) interval of the justification for a longer interval, and propose an alternative interval. An operator must send the notice to the address specified in paragraph (m) of this section.

(ii) Unavailable technology. An operator may require a longer assessment period for a segment of line pipe (for example, because sophisticated internal inspection technology is not available). An operator must notify OPS 270 days before the end of the five-year (or less) interval of the justification for a longer interval, and propose an alternative interval. An operator must send the notice to the address specified in paragraph (m) of this section.

(k) What methods to measure program effectiveness must be used? An operator’s program must include methods to measure whether the program is effective in assessing and evaluating the integrity of each pipeline segment and in protecting the high consequence areas. See Appendix C of this part for guidance on methods that can be used to evaluate a program’s effectiveness.

(l) What records must be kept?

(1) An operator must maintain for review during an inspection:

(i) A written integrity management program in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section.

(ii) Documents to support the decisions and analyses, including any modifications, justifications, variances, deviations and determinations made, and actions taken, to implement and evaluate each element of the integrity management program listed in paragraph (f) of this section.

(2) See Appendix C of this part for examples of records an operator would be required to keep.
(m) Where does an operator send a notification? An operator must send any notification required by this section to the Information Resources Manager, Office of Pipeline Safety, Research and Special Programs Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, Room 7128, 400 Seventh Street SW, Washington DC 20590, or to the facsimile number (202) 366-7128.
§ 195.588 What standards apply to direct assessment?

(a) If you use direct assessment on an onshore pipeline to evaluate the effects of external corrosion, you must follow the requirements of this section for performing external corrosion direct assessment. This section does not apply to methods associated with direct assessment, such as close interval surveys, voltage gradient surveys, or examination of exposed pipelines, when used separately from the direct assessment process.

(b) The requirements for performing external corrosion direct assessment are as follows:

(1) General. You must follow the requirements of NACE Standard RP0502–2002 (incorporated by reference, see § 195.3). Also, you must develop and implement an ECDA plan that includes procedures addressing pre-assessment, indirect examination, direct examination, and post-assessment.

(2) Pre-assessment. In addition to the requirements in Section 3 of NACE Standard RP0502–2002, the ECDA plan procedures for pre-assessment must include—

(i) Provisions for applying more restrictive criteria when conducting ECDA for the first time on a pipeline segment;

(ii) The basis on which you select at least two different, but complementary, indirect assessment tools to assess each ECDA region; and

(iii) If you utilize an indirect inspection method not described in Appendix A of NACE Standard RP0502–2002, you must demonstrate the applicability, validation, basis, equipment used, application procedure, and utilization of data for the inspection method.

(3) Indirect examination. In addition to the requirements in Section 4 of NACE Standard RP0502–2002, the procedures for indirect examination of the ECDA regions must include—

(i) Provisions for applying more restrictive criteria when conducting ECDA for the first time on a pipeline segment;

(ii) Criteria for identifying and documenting those indications that must be considered for excavation and direct examination, including at least the following:

(A) The known sensitivities of assessment tools;

(B) The procedures for using each tool; and

(C) The approach to be used for decreasing the physical spacing of indirect assessment tool readings when the presence of a defect is suspected;

(iii) For each indication identified during the indirect examination, criteria for—

(A) Defining the urgency of excavation and direct examination of the indication; and

(B) Defining the excavation urgency as immediate, scheduled, or monitored; and

(iv) Criteria for scheduling excavations of indications in each urgency level.

(4) Direct examination. In addition to the requirements in Section 5 of NACE Standard RP0502–2002, the procedures for direct examination of indications from the indirect examination must include—

(i) Provisions for applying more restrictive criteria when conducting ECDA for the first time on a pipeline segment;

(ii) Criteria for deciding what action should be taken if either:

(A) Corrosion defects are discovered that exceed allowable limits (Section 5.5.2.2 of NACE Standard RP0502–2002 provides guidance for criteria); or

(B) Root cause analysis reveals conditions for which ECDA is not suitable (Section 5.6.2 of NACE Standard RP0502–2002 provides guidance for criteria);

(iii) Criteria and notification procedures for any changes in the ECDA plan, including changes that affect the severity classification, the priority of direct examination, and the time frame for direct examination of indications; and

(iv) Criteria that describe how and on what basis you will reclassify and reprioritize any of the provisions specified in Section 5.9 of NACE Standard RP0502–2002.

(5) Post assessment and continuing evaluation. In addition to the requirements in Section 6 of NACE Standard UP 0502–2002, the procedures for post assessment of the effectiveness of the ECDA process must include—

(i) Measures for evaluating the long-term effectiveness of ECDA in addressing external corrosion in pipeline segments; and

(ii) Criteria for evaluating whether conditions discovered by direct examination of indications in each ECDA region indicate a need for reassessment of the pipeline segment at an interval less than that specified in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 of NACE Standard RP0502–2002 (see Appendix D of NACE Standard RP0502–2002).
Appendix C to Part 195—Guidance for Implementation of an Integrity Management Program

This Appendix gives guidance to help an operator implement the requirements of the integrity management program rule in §§ 195.450 and 195.452.

Guidance is provided on:

1. Information an operator may use to identify a high consequence area and factors an operator can use to consider the potential impacts of a release on an area;
2. Risk factors an operator can use to determine an integrity assessment schedule;
3. Safety risk indicator tables for a pipeline segment’s potential impact area and factors for considering a high consequence area, an operator may refer to:
   (1) Digital Data on populated areas available on U.S. Census Bureau maps.

B. The rule requires an operator to include a process in its program for identifying which pipeline segments could affect a high consequence area and to take measures to prevent and mitigate the consequences of a pipeline failure that could affect a high consequence area. (See §§ 195.452 (f) and (i).) Thus, an operator will need to consider how each pipeline segment could affect a high consequence area. The primary source for the listed risk factors is a US DOT study on instrumented Internal Inspection devices (November 1992). Other sources include the National Transportation Safety Board, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee. The following list provides guidance to an operator on both the mandatory and additional factors:

1. Terrain surrounding the pipeline. An operator should consider the contour of the land profile and if it could allow the liquid from a release to enter a high consequence area. An operator can get this information from topographical maps such as U.S. Geological Survey quadrangle maps.
2. Drainage systems such as small streams and other smaller waterways that could serve as a conduit to a high consequence area.
3. Crossing of farm tile fields. An operator should consider the possibility of a spillage in the field following the drain tile into a waterway.
4. Crossing of roadways with ditches along the side. The ditches could carry a spillage to a waterway.
5. The nature and characteristics of the product the pipeline is transporting (refined products, crude oils, highly volatile liquids, etc.) Highly volatile liquids becomes gaseous when exposed to the atmosphere. A spillage could create a vapor cloud that could settle into the lower elevation of the ground profile.
6. Physical support of the pipeline segment such as by a cable suspension bridge. An operator should look for stress indicators on the pipeline (strained supports, inadequate support at towers), atmospheric corrosion, vandalism, and other obvious signs of improper maintenance.
7. Operating conditions of the pipeline (pressure, flow rate, etc.). Exposure of the pipeline to an operating pressure exceeding the established maximum operating pressure.
8. The hydraulic gradient of the pipeline.
9. The diameter of the pipeline, the potential release volume, and the distance between the isolation points.
10. Potential physical pathways between the pipeline and the high consequence area.
11. Response capability (time to respond, nature of response).
12. Potential natural forces inherent in the area (flood zones, earthquakes, subsidence areas, etc.)

II. Risk factors for establishing frequency of assessment.

A. By assigning weights or values to the risk factors, and using the risk indicator tables, an operator can determine the priority for assessing pipeline segments, beginning with those segments that are of highest risk, that have not previously been assessed. This list provides some
guidance on some of the risk factors to consider (see § 195.452(e)). An operator should also develop factors specific to each pipeline segment it is assessing, including:

1. Populated areas, unusually sensitive environmental areas, National Fish Hatcheries, commercially navigable waters, areas where people congregate.

2. Results from previous testing/inspection. (See § 195.452(h).)

3. Leak History. (See leak history risk table.)

4. Known corrosion or condition of pipeline. (See § 195.452(g).)

5. Cathodic protection history.

6. Type and quality of pipe coating (disbonded coating results in corrosion).

7. Age of pipe (older pipe shows more corrosion—may be uncoated or have an ineffective coating) and type of pipe seam. (See Age of Pipe risk table.)

8. Product transported (highly volatile, highly flammable and toxic liquids present a greater threat for both people and the environment) (see Product transported risk table.)

9. Pipe wall thickness (thicker walls give a better safety margin)

10. Size of pipe (higher volume release if the pipe ruptures).

11. Location related to potential ground movement (e.g., seismic faults, rock quarries, and coal mines); climatic (permafrost causes settlement-Alaska); geologic (landslides or subsidence).

12. Security of throughput (effects on customers if there is failure requiring shutdown).

13. Time since the last internal inspection/pressure testing.

14. With respect to previously discovered defects/anomalies, the type, growth rate, and size.

15. Operating stress levels in the pipeline.

16. Location of the pipeline segment as it relates to the ability of the operator to detect and respond to a leak. (e.g., pipelines deep underground, or in locations that make leak detection difficult without specific sectional monitoring and/or significantly impede access for spill response or any other purpose).

17. Physical support of the segment such as by a cable suspension bridge.

18. Non-standard or other than recognized industry practice on pipeline installation (e.g., horizontal directional drilling).

B. Example: This example illustrates a hypothetical model used to establish an integrity assessment schedule for a hypothetical pipeline segment. After we determine the risk factors applicable to the pipeline segment, we then assign values or numbers to each factor, such as, high (5), moderate (3), or low (1). We can determine an overall risk classification (A, B, C) for the segment using the risk tables and a sliding scale (values 5 to 1) for risk factors for which tables are not provided. We would classify a segment as C if it fell above 2/3 of maximum value (highest overall risk value for any one segment when compared with other segments of a pipeline), a segment as B if it fell between 1/3 to 2/3 of maximum value, and the remaining segments as A.

i. For the baseline assessment schedule, we would plan to assess 50% of all pipeline segments covered by the rule, beginning with the highest risk segments, within the first 3 1/2 years and the remaining segments within the seven-year period. For the continuing integrity assessments, we would plan to assess the C segments within the first two (2) years of the schedule, the segments classified as moderate risk no later than year three or four and the remaining lowest risk segments no later than year five (5).

ii. For our hypothetical pipeline segment, we have chosen the following risk factors and obtained risk factor values from the appropriate table. The values assigned to the risk factors are for illustration only.

Age of pipeline: 34 years old (refer to "Age of Pipeline" risk table) - Risk Value = 5
Pressure tested: Yes, tested once during construction - Risk Value = 5
Coated: Yes - Risk Value = 1
Cathodically Protected: Yes - Risk Value = 1
Date cathodic protection installed: Yes - Risk Value = 1
Anomalies found: Yes, but do not pose an immediate safety risk or environmental hazard - Risk Value = 3
Leak History: Yes, one spill in last 10 years. (refer to "Leak History" risk table) - Risk Value = 2
Product transported: Diesel fuel - Risk Value = 1
Pipe size: 16 inches. Size presents moderate risk (refer to "Line Size" risk table) - Risk Value = 3

iii. Overall risk value for this hypothetical segment of pipe is 34. Assume we have two other pipeline segments for which we conduct similar risk rankings. The second pipeline segment has an overall risk value of 20, and the third segment, 11. For the baseline assessment we would establish a schedule where we assess the first segment (highest risk segment) within two years, the second segment within five years and the third segment within seven years. Similarly, for the continuing integrity assessment, we could establish an assessment schedule where we assess the highest risk segment no later than the second year, the second segment no later than the third year, and the third segment no later than the fifth year.
III. Safety risk indicator tables for leak history, volume or line size, age of pipeline, and product transported.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safety Risk Indicator</th>
<th>Leak history (Time-dependent defects) 1</th>
<th>Safety Risk Indicator</th>
<th>Line Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High ................</td>
<td>&gt; 3 Spills in last 10 years</td>
<td>High ................</td>
<td>≥ 18”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low ..............</td>
<td>&lt; 3 Spills in last 10 years</td>
<td>Moderate...</td>
<td>10”-16” nominal diameters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low ..............</td>
<td>≤ 8” nominal diameter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Time-dependent defects are those that result in spills due to corrosion, gouges, or problems developed during manufacture, construction or operation, etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line Size or Volume Transported</th>
<th>Product Transported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safety Risk Indicator</td>
<td>Considerations 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High ................</td>
<td>(Highly volatile and flammable) .........................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium............</td>
<td>Highly toxic .........................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low .............</td>
<td>Flammable-flashpoint &lt;100F .........................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-flammable-flashpoint 100+F .........................</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The degree of acute and chronic toxicity to humans, wildlife, and aquatic life; reactivity; and, volatility, flammability, and water solubility determine the Product Indicator. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act Reportable Quantity values may be used as an indication of chronic toxicity. National Fire Protection Association health factors may be used for rating acute hazards.

IV. Types of internal inspection tools to use.

An operator should consider at least two types of internal inspection tools for the integrity assessment from the following list. The type of tool or tools an operator selects will depend on the results from previous internal inspection runs, information analysis and risk factors specific to the pipeline segment:

1. Geometry Internal inspection tools for detecting changes to ovality, e.g., bends, dents, buckles or wrinkles, due to construction flaws or soil movement, or other outside force damage;
2. Metal Loss Tools (Ultrasonic and Magnetic Flux Leakage) for determining pipe wall anomalies, e.g., wall loss due to corrosion.
3. Crack Detection Tools for detecting cracks and crack-like features, e.g., stress corrosion cracking (SCC), fatigue cracks, narrow axial corrosion, toe cracks, hook cracks, etc.

V. Methods to measure performance.

A. General. (1) This guidance is to help an operator establish measures to evaluate the effectiveness of its integrity management program. The performance measures required will depend on the details of each integrity management program and will be based on an understanding and analysis of the failure mechanisms or threats to integrity of each pipeline segment.

(2) An operator should select a set of measurements to judge how well its program is performing. An operator’s objectives for its program are to ensure public safety, prevent or minimize leaks and spills and prevent property and environmental damage. A typical integrity management program will be an ongoing program and it may contain many elements. Therefore, several performance measure are likely to be needed to measure the effectiveness of an ongoing program.

B. Performance measures. These measures show how a program to control risk on pipeline segments that could affect a high consequence area is progressing under the integrity management requirements. Performance measures generally fall into three categories:

1. Selected Activity Measures-Measures that monitor the surveillance and preventive activities the operator has implemented. These measures indicate how well an operator is implementing the various elements of its integrity management program.

2. Deterioration Measures-Operation and maintenance trends that indicate when the integrity of the system is weakening despite preventive measures. This category of performance measure may indicate that the system condition is deteriorating despite well executed preventive activities.

3. Failure Measures-Leak History, incident response, product loss, etc. These measures will indicate progress towards fewer spills and less damage.

C. Internal vs. External Comparisons. These comparisons show how a pipeline segment that could affect a high consequence area is progressing in comparison to the operator’s other pipeline segments that are not covered by the integrity management requirements and how that pipeline segment compares to
other operators’ pipeline segments.
(1) Internal—Comparing data from the pipeline segment that could affect the high consequence area with data from pipeline segments in other areas of the system may indicate the effects from the attention given to the high consequence area.

(2) External—Comparing data external to the pipeline segment (e.g., OPS incident data) may provide measures on the frequency and size of leaks in relation to other companies.

D. Examples. Some examples of performance measures an operator could use include:

(1) A performance measurement goal to reduce the total volume from unintended releases by -% (percent to be determined by operator) with an ultimate goal of zero.

(2) A performance measurement goal to reduce the total number of unintended releases (based on a threshold of 5 gallons) by II -% (percent to be determined by operator) with an ultimate goal of zero.

(3) A performance measurement goal to document the percentage of integrity management activities completed during the calendar year.

(4) A performance measurement goal to track and evaluate the effectiveness of the operator's community outreach activities.

(5) A narrative description of pipeline system integrity, including a summary of performance improvements, both qualitative and quantitative, to an operator’s integrity management program prepared periodically.

(6) A performance measure based on internal audits of the operator’s pipeline system per 49 CFR Part 195.


(8) A performance measure based on operational events (for example: relief occurrences, unplanned valve closure, SCADA outages, etc.) that have the potential to adversely affect pipeline integrity.

(9) A performance measure to demonstrate that the operator’s integrity management program reduces risk over time with a focus on high risk items.

(10) A performance measure to demonstrate that the operator's integrity management program for pipeline stations and terminals reduces risk over time with a focus on high risk items.

VI. Examples of types of records an operator must maintain.
The rule requires an operator to maintain certain records. (See §195.452(l)). This section provides examples of some records that an operator would have to maintain for inspection to comply with the requirement. This is not an exhaustive list.

(a) a process for identifying which pipelines could affect a high consequence area and a document identifying all pipeline segments that could affect a high consequence area;

(b) a plan for baseline assessment of the line pipe that includes each required plan element;

(c) modifications to the baseline plan and reasons for the modification;

(d) use of and support for an alternative practice;

(e) a framework addressing each required element of the integrity management program, updates and changes to the initial framework and eventual program;

(f) a process for identifying a new high consequence area and incorporating it into the baseline plan, particularly, a process for identifying population changes around a pipeline segment;

(g) an explanation of methods selected to assess the integrity of line pipe;

(h) a process for review of integrity assessment results and data analysis by a person qualified to evaluate the results and data;

(i) the process and risk factors for determining the baseline assessment interval;

(j) results of the baseline integrity assessment;

(k) the process used for continual evaluation, and risk factors used for determining the frequency of evaluation;