

on or before May 29, 1969, will be considered before final action is taken on the proposal. All comments received will be available for examination by interested persons at the Office of the Secretary, Hazardous Materials Regulations Board, both before and after the closing date for comments.

Adoption of this proposal will provide for the use of so-called three-piece cylinders which have longitudinal seams that are electric-arc welded. One cylinder presently authorized for acetylene, specification 8 (§ 178.59), permits a longitudinal seam only if forge lapwelded.

One manufacturer has reported that its experience in the manufacture and testing of specification 4BW cylinders has indicated no failures in those tested at 4 times service pressure, that normal pressure ruptures occurred at approximately 5 to 6 times service pressure, such failures never occurring in the electric-arc welded longitudinal seams.

This proposal appears to be justified since (1) electric-arc welded longitudinal seams are generally more reliable than those which are forge lap welded, (2) the required hydrostatic test pressure for each cylinder produced is two times the marked service pressure (minimum test pressure, 500 pounds per square inch), the same as for acetylene cylinders presently authorized, (3) the random hydrostatic test on one cylinder out of each lot of 500 cylinders or less is 4 times service pressure (minimum test pressure, 1000 pounds per square inch) as compared with a minimum test pressure of 750 pounds per square inch (minimum, 3 times service pressure) out of each lot of 200 cylinders or less for acetylene cylinders presently authorized and (4) the joint efficiency for the proposed specification cylinder is related to a radiographic inspection criteria.

In consideration of the foregoing, it is proposed to amend § 173.303 to authorize specification 8BW cylinders for acetylene. In addition, it is proposed to add § 178.62 in Part 178 to read as follows:

§ 178.62 Specification 8BW; welded steel cylinder with porous filling for acetylene.

§ 178.62-1 Compliance.

(a) Each cylinder must meet the requirements of this section and the pertinent requirements of § 173.24 of this chapter.

§ 178.62-2 Construction, inspection, and testing.

(a) Cylinders must be constructed, inspected, and tested in accordance with the requirements for specification 4BW cylinders as specified in § 178.61.

(b) Minimum service pressure may not be less than 250 pounds per square inch.

§ 178.62-3 Porous filling.

(a) Each cylinder must be filled with porous material and solvent within the limitations and in the manner specified in § 178.60-20.

§ 178.62-4 Marking.

(a) Marking must be as specified in § 178.61-20 except that 8 must be substituted for 4 to make the specification identification DOT-8BW. In addition, the tare weight of the cylinder with porous material, solvent, and valve, but without removable cap must be stamped near the other required markings in pounds and ounces.

§ 178.62-5 Inspector's reports.

(a) Inspector's reports must be prepared and certified as specified in §§ 178.60-24(b) and 178.61-21 with the specification identification entered as DOT-8BW. Such reports must be forwarded in accordance with § 178.61-4(d).

This proposal is made under the authority of sections 831-835 of title 18 United States Code, section 9 of the Department of Transportation Act (49 U.S.C. 1657), and title VI and section 902(h) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1421-1430 and 1472(h)).

Issued in Washington, D.C., on April 16, 1969.

C. P. MURPHY,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard,
by direction of Commandant,
U.S. Coast Guard.

JOHN R. JAMIESON,
Deputy Administrator,
Federal Highway Administration.

R. N. WHITMAN,
Administrator,
Federal Railroad Administration.

SAM SCHNEIDER,
Board Member for the
Federal Aviation Administration.

[F.R. Doc. 69-4859; Filed, Apr. 22, 1969;
8:52 a.m.]

[49 CFR Part 180]

[Docket No. HM-6A]

TRANSPORTATION OF HIGHLY VOLATILE LIQUIDS BY PIPELINE

Request for Public Advice; Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making

Highly volatile liquids, such as liquefied petroleum gas and anhydrous ammonia, are transported by pipeline in ever-increasing quantities. From a review of the accident reports for 1968, we believe that we may need higher safety standards for the transportation of highly volatile liquids than for other liquid products.

This advance notice of proposed rule making invites the public to help us define the safety problems and devise solutions to those problems. We are now working on regulations to cover general pipeline operations, without special provisions for highly volatile liquids. We invite advice on (i) the extra hazards resulting from the high volatility of these liquids, as distinguished from less volatile liquids such as jet fuel and gasoline, and (ii) the safety standards required to cope with the extra hazards.

Facts. Our information is far from complete, since we have accident reports only from January 1, 1968. But the information we have is quite enough to cause this inquiry, as these examples show.

Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) is the principal highly volatile liquid transported by pipeline. Although involved in only 9 percent of the accidents reported in 1968, LPG caused 82 percent of the deaths, 37 percent of the personal injuries, and 26 percent of the property damage.

Ruptures of LPG lines frequently release thousands of barrels of product. The largest LPG spill reported in 1968 was 6,126 barrels (257,292 gallons) from an 8-inch line. Had the pipe been larger, the amount of LPG released would have been larger. Under the same circumstances, a 10-inch line would have spilled 9,572 barrels (402,024 gallons) and a 12-inch line would have spilled 13,783 barrels (578,886 gallons).

On June 1, 1968, an 8-inch pipeline ruptured in Coshocton County, Ohio, spilling 4,100 barrels (172,200 gallons) of LPG. Vapor from the spill flowed down a small valley, covering an area about 200 yards wide and more than a mile long. There were no residences in the area covered by the vapor, but there were five people. When the vapor was ignited probably by an automobile, the flash fire killed three of them and critically burned the other two.

Anhydrous ammonia has only recently entered into pipeline transportation, so we have limited experience with it. However, much of our experience with LPG is pertinent to anhydrous ammonia. The amount of anhydrous ammonia which would be spilled after a rupture should be substantially the same as LPG. Both vaporize when spilled. Although the flow characteristics of the vapors differ, the vapors of both may be hazardous quite a distance from the spill.

A recent railroad accident illustrates the harm which can result from the spill of anhydrous ammonia. On February 18, 1969, a railroad train accident in Crete, Nebr., ruptured a tank car and released 30,703 gallons of liquefied anhydrous ammonia, which vaporized upon release from pressure. The asphyxiating vapors killed six people, hospitalized 14, and injured 23 others. Although the weather was calm, the vapors spread over a large area. The persons killed were 250 to 400 feet from the ruptured tank car. The civil authorities evacuated 300 residents from an area about 1 mile square.

Pipelines cross rivers which supply municipal water systems. Anhydrous ammonia dissolves readily in water. One-half part per million is the highest concentration of ammonia which is acceptable for public water supplies, using common treatment processes. (Report of the Committee on Water Quality Criteria, Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, U.S. Department of the Interior (1968).) Allowing for the difference in weight, this is comparable to

1 gallon of anhydrous ammonia in 1,366,800 gallons of water; a spill of 257,292 gallons into a municipal water source would contaminate over 350 billion gallons of water.

Discussion. These highly volatile liquids are essential to the national economy. Our objective is to set safety standards which will minimize the hazard to the public, within the limits of technical feasibility and economic practicability.

Our safety standards should be designed to prevent failures, since a failure almost anywhere could result in loss of life. The danger is greater where the population density is higher, but the mobility of these vapors makes them a threat even in sparsely settled areas. These are some of the regulatory actions which might be appropriate to the prevention of pipe failures:

1. Prohibit the use of high yield strength pipe, because it is more susceptible to stress corrosion cracking. Further, pipe manufacture and pipeline construction tolerances are more critical with high yield strength pipe.

2. Require 100 percent nondestructive testing of all welds, including longitudinal welds. We have reports of longitudinal and girth weld failures which should be prevented by these tests.

3. Require independent inspection of the manufacture of the pipe and construction of the pipeline. We have reports of failure of pipelines which should not have occurred, if the pipe manufacturer and the pipeline builder had done their work properly. An independent inspector should improve quality control.

4. Require a lower operating pressure, in relation to test pressure, for highly volatile liquids than for other liquids. We should require a higher safety factor when the pipeline is carrying a product which is inherently more dangerous in the event of rupture.

5. Improve the means of marking or protecting the pipeline. About 20 percent of reported pipeline ruptures are caused by external force. All of these ruptures occurred with one person or more in the near vicinity.

6. Require periodic determination of the integrity of the pipeline and repair of deficient pipe. The determination could be by electronic, sonic, or other means of monitoring corrosion and changes in the metallurgy of the pipe.

7. Require early protection against corrosion and frequent testing of the efficacy of the protective system. Corrosion is the largest single cause of reported liquid pipeline failures.

Our safety standards should be designed to minimize loss of product, in event of rupture. These are some of the regulatory actions which might be appropriate to minimize loss of product.

1. Require that all main line valves be either automatic or remotely controlled from manned locations. The loss of 6,126 barrels (257,292 gallons) of highly volatile liquid in a single spill is not tolerable. The distance between valves is also a factor in limiting the spill.

2. Limit the size of pipe. As noted in the third paragraph of "Facts", the spill

from a 10-inch line would be more than 50 percent greater than from an 8-inch line and the spill from a 12-inch line would be more than twice as much. Of course, the amount of spill could be controlled by having valves closer together on larger pipe.

3. Require frequent patrol inspection to find small leaks.

Our safety standards should be designed to provide a higher level of safety for critical areas than for open country. When an area builds up so that it is no longer open country, the pipeline operator should meet the higher standards. Critical areas include residential areas, places where people gather, river crossings, and municipal water sources. How should we define these areas? Should we require that pipelines be routed around critical areas, where practicable?

Scope of notice. This is not a proposal to change the regulations. It is an effort to get public participation early in the rule making process. It is an effort to develop facts upon which to base rational rule making. We invite the general public to advise us on all aspects of this subject.

We invite interested persons to give us their views by June 23, 1969. Advice (identifying the docket number) should be submitted in duplicate to the Secretary, Hazardous Materials Regulations Board, Department of Transportation, 400 Sixth Street SW., Washington, D.C. 20590.

Issued in Washington, D.C., on April 18, 1969.

WILLIAM C. JENNINGS,
Director,
Office of Hazardous Materials.

[F.R. Doc. 69-4860; Filed, Apr. 22, 1969; 8:52 a.m.]

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

[5 CFR Part 890 I

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM

Change of Enrollment

Notice is hereby given that under authority of section 8913 of title 5, United States Code, it is proposed to amend Part 890 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations by revising § 890.301(d) (2) to read as follows:

§ 890.301 Opportunities to register to enroll and change enrollment.

* * * * *

(d) * * *

(2) During the period November 10 to November 28, 1969, an employee who is not registered to be enrolled may register to be enrolled, and any enrolled employee or annuitant may change his enrollment from one plan or option to another, or from self alone to self and family, or both.

* * * * *

This proposal would extend to annuitants the same privileges now granted to employees to change their health bene-

fits enrollments during the 1969 open season. Interested persons may submit written comments, objections, or suggestions to the Bureau of Retirement, Insurance, and Occupational Health, U.S. Civil Service Commission, Washington, D.C. 20415, within 30 days of the date of publication of this notice in the FEDERAL REGISTER.

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
JAMES C. SPRY,
Executive Assistant to the Commissioners.

[SEAL]

[F.R. Doc. 69-4814; Filed, Apr. 22, 1969; 8:49 a.m.]

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[47 CFR Part 63 I

[Docket No. 18509]

CHANNEL FACILITIES FURNISHED TO AFFILIATED COMMUNITY ANTENNA TELEVISION SYSTEMS.

Applications for Certificates

In the matter of applications of telephone companies for section 214 certificates for channel facilities furnished to affiliated community antenna television systems, Docket No. 18509.

1. The Commission has received a joint request that the time for filing comments in the above-captioned matter be extended from May 2, 1969, to June 2, 1969. The request for extension of time was filed by The Conestoga Telephone and Telegraph Co., Birdsboro, Pa., and Enterprise Telephone Co., New Holland, Pa.

2. It is stated that the additional time is needed so that persons interested in both this proceeding and in the proceeding in Docket No. 18397, CATV, notice of proposed rulemaking and notice of inquiry, 15 F.C.C. 2d 417, may file meaningful comments in each proceeding.

3. In consideration of the relationship between these two proceedings and inasmuch as May 2, 1969, is the same day on which comments are due in Docket No. 18397, it appears that the joint request is reasonable and that the public interest would be served by a grant of the requested extension.

4. *Accordingly, it is ordered,* Pursuant to authority delegated by § 0.303(c) of the Commission's rules, that the time for filing comments and reply comments to the above-captioned proceedings is hereby extended, respectively, to June 2, 1969, and June 16, 1969.

Adopted: April 16, 1969.

Released: April 17, 1969.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,

[SEAL] FRANK PALIK,
Chief, Domestic Services and Facilities Division, for Chief, Common Carrier Bureau.

[F.R. Doc. 69-4844; Filed, Apr. 22, 1969; 8:51 a.m.]