

DOT US Department of Transportation
PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
OPS Office of Pipeline Safety
Central Region

Principal Investigator Allan Beshore and Gery Bauman
Senior Accident Investigator Bryan Louque
Region Director David Barrett
Date of Report 12/15/2011
Subject Failure Investigation Report – TEPPCO Propane Fire

Operator, Location, & Consequences

Date of Failure 9/18/2005
Commodity Released Propane
City/County & State Monroe/Butler, OH
OpID & Operator Name 19237 TE Products Pipeline Company, LLC
Unit # & Unit Name 4213 Allegheny
SMART Activity # 116286
Milepost / Location Todhunter Terminal
Type of Failure Leak caused by incorrect operation
Fatalities 1
Injuries 0
Description of area impacted Terminal property, did not affect an HCA
Total Costs \$5,901,302 (Appendix A)

Failure Investigation Report – TEPPCO Propane Fire

9/18/2005

Executive Summary

A TEPPCO employee was killed during an explosion and fire at a TEPPCO (Enterprise) terminal in Ohio. Propane leaked from the drain line of a propane/water separator. The cause of the accident is Incorrect Operations. OPS conferred with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and agreed that OSHA would investigate the failure.

System Details

The Todhunter Terminal is operated by TE Products Pipeline Company, LLC (TEPPCO) as part of the larger Enterprise Operating Products, LLC pipeline network. Todhunter receives highly volatile liquids (HVLs) through a pipeline originating in the Gulf Coast area. Incoming HVLs can be stored in underground caverns or aboveground tanks. The pipeline supplying Todhunter extends past the terminal to another TEPPCO facility in Lebanon, OH. Three pipelines exit Todhunter. One delivers jet fuel supplies to the Cincinnati airport. A bi-directional pipeline runs from the terminal to Lebanon, OH and then on to Lima, OH. The third pipeline primarily transports propane to the northeast market.

Due to extensive damage to terminal equipment, jet fuel transport to the Cincinnati airport was accomplished by truck until the terminal was fully operational. There were no other supply impacts as a result of the failure.

Events Leading up to the Failure

Three TEPPCO employees were working at the terminal. Among other things, the employees were withdrawing propane from an underground cavern. Water typically mixes with propane while it is stored underground. The propane must be dehydrated before it can be shipped to the northeast market. The propane and water mix from the cavern flows into a separator tank. Since water is heavier than propane, the water settles to the bottom of the tank and “dry” propane exits near the top. Sensors on the separator tank monitor the water level to alert operating personnel that water must be drained through a 2” pipe leaving the bottom of the tank. By opening a ¼ turn valve on the 2” piping, the water flows to a sump where it evaporates over time. TEPPCO employees were instructed to slightly open the ¼ turn valve and allow water to flow out until hearing a distinctive change in the sound of the flow. This audible change combined with a slight “jump” on the valve indicated that propane had begun flowing out of the tank and it was time to close the valve. Water had been drained from the tank several times during the hours before the failure.

At approximately 10:50 pm on 9/18/2005, all three TEPPCO employees were in the control room when an alert indicated that water needed to be drained from the separator tank. One of the employees left the control room to drain the water. After a few minutes the two employees remaining in the control room heard a loud hissing and could see a vapor cloud in the vicinity of the separator tank.

Emergency Response

One employee left the control room to look for the employee who had left to drain the water. However, he was driven away from the failure location by the vapor cloud. The other employee in the control room activated the facility emergency shut-down system and then moved away from the vapor cloud. Although the details are not known for certain, ignition and more than one explosion occurred. The two TEPPCO employees called 911 and manually closed valves in an attempt to limit the flow of propane to the fire.

The local fire department arrived on the scene. Working cooperatively with TEPPCO employees, the fire department extinguished structure fires, but allowed escaping propane to burn until the source of

Failure Investigation Report – TEPPCO Propane Fire

9/18/2005

propane was depleted. The remains of the third TEPPCO employee were found near the separator tank water drain valves.

TEPPCO notified the National Response Center at 4:32 pm on 9/19/2005 (Appendix B).

Findings and Contributing Factors

OPS conferred with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and agreed that OSHA would investigate the failure. An OSHA press release dated March 20, 2006 summarizes the OSHA investigation (Appendix C) - "...OSHA issued citations alleging 15 serious violations with penalties totaling \$103,000 and two repeat violations with \$70,000 in proposed penalties for failure to comply with federal workplace safety and health standards. Among the serious violations cited were inadequate standard operating procedures for handling propane gas, lack of self-closing valves, lack of training for employees, and use of radio-phones that were not intrinsically safe in hazardous locations. Alleged repeat violations included failure to perform inspections and tests on equipment that controlled the flow of water and propane, lack of written mechanical integrity procedures and failure to correct items found during mandated internal compliance audits of the facility..."

Appendices

- A TEPPCO Accident Report to PHMSA
- B NRC Report
- C OSHA Press Release, dated March 20, 2006



U.S. Department of Transportation
Research and Special Programs
Administration

ACCIDENT REPORT – HAZARDOUS LIQUID PIPELINE SYSTEMS

Report Date _____

No. _____
(DOT Use Only)

INSTRUCTIONS

Important: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before you begin. They clarify the information requested and provide specific examples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the Office Of Pipeline Safety Web Page at <http://ops.dot.gov>.

PART A – GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION

Check one or more boxes as appropriate:

Original Report Supplemental Report Final Report

1. a. Operator's OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) _____ / _____ /
2. b. If Operator does not own the pipeline, enter Owner's OPS 5-digit Identification Number (if known) _____ / _____ /
- c. Name of Operator _____
- d. Operator street address _____
- e. Operator address _____
City, County, State and Zip Code _____

IMPORTANT: IF THE SPILL IS SMALL, THAT IS, THE AMOUNT IS AT LEAST 5 GALLONS BUT IS LESS THAN 5 BARRELS, COMPLETE THIS PAGE ONLY, UNLESS THE SPILL IS TO WATER AS DESCRIBED IN 49 CFR §195.52(A)(4) OR IS OTHERWISE REPORTABLE UNDER §195.50 AS REVISED IN CY 2001.

2. Time and date of the accident
 _____ / _____ / _____ / _____
 hr. month day year

3. Location of accident
(If offshore, do not complete a through d. See Part C.1)
 - a. Latitude: _____ Longitude: _____
(if not available, see instructions for how to provide specific location)
 - b. _____
City, and County or Parish
 - c. _____
State and Zip Code
 - d. Mile post/valve station or survey station no.
(whichever gives more accurate location)

4. Telephone report
 _____ / _____ / _____ / _____
 NRC Report Number month day year

5. Losses (Estimated)

Public/Community Losses reimbursed by operator:

Public/private property damage \$ _____
 Cost of emergency response phase \$ _____
 Cost of environmental remediation \$ _____
 Other Costs \$ _____
 (describe) _____

Operator Losses:

Value of product lost \$ _____
 Value of operator property damage \$ _____
 Other Costs \$ _____
 (describe) _____

Total Costs \$ _____

6. Commodity Spilled Yes No
(If Yes, complete Parts a through c where applicable)
 - a. Name of commodity spilled _____
 - b. Classification of commodity spilled:
 HVLs /other flammable or toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions
 CO₂ or other non-flammable, non-toxic fluid which is a gas at ambient conditions
 Gasoline, diesel, fuel oil or other petroleum product which is a liquid at ambient conditions
 Crude oil

c. Estimated amount of commodity involved :

Barrels
Gallons (check only if spill is less than one barrel)

Amounts:

Spilled : _____

Recovered: _____

CAUSES FOR SMALL SPILLS ONLY (5 gallons to under 5 barrels) :

(For large spills [5 barrels or greater] see Part H)

Corrosion	Natural Forces	Excavation Damage	Other Outside Force Damage
Material and/or Weld Failures	Equipment	Incorrect Operation	Other

PART B – PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

(type or print) Preparer's Name and Title

Area Code and Telephone Number

Preparer's E-mail Address

Area Code and Facsimile Number

Authorized Signature

(type or print) Name and Title

Date

Area Code and Telephone Number

PART C – ORIGIN OF THE ACCIDENT (Check all that apply)

1. Additional location information
 a. Line segment name or ID _____
 b. Accident on Federal land other than Outer Continental Shelf Yes No
 c. Is pipeline interstate? Yes No
 Offshore: Yes No (complete d if offshore)
 d. Area _____ Block # _____
 State /_____/ or Outer Continental Shelf

2. Location of system involved (check all that apply)
 Operator's Property
 Pipeline Right of Way
 High Consequence Area (HCA)?
 Describe HCA _____

3. Part of system involved in accident
 Above Ground Storage Tank
 Cavern or other below ground storage facility
 Pump/meter station; terminal/tank farm piping and equipment, including sumps
 Other Specify: _____
 Onshore **pipeline**, including valve sites
 Offshore **pipeline**, including platforms

If failure occurred on Pipeline, complete items a - g:

4. Failure occurred on

Body of Pipe	Pipe Seam	Scraper Trap
Pump	Sump	Joint
Component	Valve	Metering Facility
Repair Sleeve	Welded Fitting	Bolted Fitting
Girth Weld		
Other (specify) _____		

 Year the component that failed was installed: /_____/

5. Maximum operating pressure (MOP)
 a. Estimated pressure at point and time of accident: _____ PSIG
 b. MOP at time of accident: _____ PSIG
 c. Did an overpressurization occur relating to the accident?
 Yes No

a. Type of leak or rupture
 Leak: Pinhole Connection Failure (complete sec. H5)
 Puncture, diameter (inches) _____
 Rupture: Circumferential – Separation
 Longitudinal – Tear/Crack, length (inches) _____
 Propagation Length, total, both sides (feet) _____
 N/A
 Other _____

b. Type of block valve used for isolation of immediate section:
 Upstream: Manual Automatic Remote Control
 Check Valve
 Downstream: Manual Automatic Remote Control
 Check Valve

c. Length of segment isolated _____ ft
 d. Distance between valves _____ ft
 e. Is segment configured for internal inspection tools? Yes No
 f. Had there been an in-line inspection device run at the point of failure? Yes No Don't Know
 Not Possible due to physical constraints in the system
 g. If Yes, type of device run (check all that apply)
 High Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run: _____
 Low Resolution Magnetic Flux tool Year run: _____
 UT tool Year run: _____
 Geometry tool Year run: _____
 Caliper tool Year run: _____
 Crack tool Year run: _____
 Hard Spot tool Year run: _____
 Other tool Year run: _____

PART D – MATERIAL SPECIFICATION

1. Nominal pipe size (NPS) _____ / in.
 2. Wall thickness _____ / in.
 3. Specification _____ SMYS _____
 4. Seam type _____
 5. Valve type _____
 6. Manufactured by _____ in year /_____/

PART E – ENVIRONMENT

1. Area of accident
 In open ditch
 Under pavement Above ground
 Underground Under water
 Inside/under building Other _____

2. Depth of cover: _____ inches

PART F – CONSEQUENCES

1. Consequences (check and complete all that apply)
 a. Number of operator employees: _____
 Contractor employees working for operator: _____
 General public: _____
Totals: _____
 b. Was pipeline/segment shutdown due to leak? Yes No
 If Yes, how long? _____ days _____ hours _____ minutes
 c. Product ignited Yes No
 d. Explosion Yes No
 e. Evacuation (general public only) _____ / people
 Reason for Evacuation:
 Precautionary by company
 Evacuation required or initiated by public official
 f. Elapsed time until area was made safe:
 _____ / hr. _____ / min.

2. Environmental Impact
 a. Wildlife Impact: Fish/aquatic Yes No
 Birds Yes No
 Terrestrial Yes No
 b. Soil Contamination Yes No
 If Yes, estimated number of cubic yards: _____
 c. Long term impact assessment performed: Yes No
 d. Anticipated remediation Yes No
 If Yes, check all that apply: Surface water Groundwater Soil Vegetation Wildlife
 e. Water Contamination: Yes No (If Yes, provide the following)
 Amount in water _____ barrels
 Ocean/Seawater No Yes
 Surface No Yes
 Groundwater No Yes
 Drinking water No Yes (If Yes, check below.)
 Private well Public water intake

PART G – LEAK DETECTION INFORMATION

1. Computer based leak detection capability in place? Yes No
2. Was the release initially detected by? (check one):
 CPM/SCADA-based system with leak detection
 Static shut-in test or other pressure or leak test
 Local operating personnel, procedures or equipment
 Remote operating personnel, including controllers
 Air patrol or ground surveillance
 A third party Other (specify) _____
3. Estimated leak duration days ____ hours ____

PART H – APPARENT CAUSE

Important: There are 25 numbered causes in this Part H. Check the box corresponding to the primary cause of the accident. Check one circle in each of the supplemental categories corresponding to the cause you indicate. See the instructions for guidance.

H1 – CORROSION

- | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|
| <p>1. External Corrosion</p> <p>2. Internal Corrosion</p> <p>(Complete items a – e where applicable.)</p> | <p>a. Pipe Coating
Bare
Coated</p> | <p>b. Visual Examination
Localized Pitting
General Corrosion
Other _____</p> | <p>c. Cause of Corrosion
Galvanic Atmospheric
Stray Current Microbiological
Cathodic Protection Disrupted
Stress Corrosion Cracking
Selective Seam Corrosion
Other _____</p> |
|---|--|--|--|
- d. Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering accident?
 No Yes, Year Protection Started: _____
- e. Was pipe previously damaged in the area of corrosion?
 No Yes => Estimated time prior to accident: / _____ / years / _____ / months Unknown

H2 – NATURAL FORCES

3. Earth Movement => Earthquake Subsidence Landslide Other _____
4. Lightning
5. Heavy Rains/Floods => Washouts Flotation Mudslide Scouring Other _____
6. Temperature => Thermal stress Frost heave Frozen components Other _____
7. High Winds

H3 – EXCAVATION DAMAGE

8. Operator Excavation Damage (including their contractors/Not Third Party)
9. Third Party (complete a-f)
- a. Excavator group
 General Public Government Excavator other than Operator/subcontractor
- b. Type: Road Work Pipeline Water Electric Sewer Phone/Cable
 Landowner-not farming related Farming Railroad
 Other liquid or gas transmission pipeline operator or their contractor
 Nautical Operations Other _____
- c. Excavation was: Open Trench Sub-strata (boring, directional drilling, etc...)
- d. Excavation was an ongoing activity (Month or longer) Yes No If Yes, Date of last contact / _____ /
- e. Did operator get prior notification of excavation activity?
 Yes; Date received: / _____ / mo. / _____ / day / _____ / yr. No
 Notification received from: One Call System Excavator Contractor Landowner
- f. Was pipeline marked as result of location request for excavation? No Yes (If Yes, check applicable items i - iv)
- i. Temporary markings: Flags Stakes Paint
- ii. Permanent markings:
- iii. Marks were (check one) : Accurate Not Accurate
- iv. Were marks made within required time? Yes No

H4 – OTHER OUTSIDE FORCE DAMAGE

10. Fire/Explosion as primary cause of failure => Fire/Explosion cause: Man made Natural
11. Car, truck or other vehicle not relating to excavation activity damaging pipe
12. Rupture of Previously Damaged Pipe
13. Vandalism


H5 – MATERIAL AND/OR WELD FAILURES

Material

- 14. Body of Pipe => Dent Gouge Bend Arc Burn Other _____
- 15. Component => Valve Fitting Vessel Extruded Outlet Other _____
- 16. Joint => Gasket O-Ring Threads Other _____

Weld

- 17. Butt => Pipe Fabrication Other _____
- 18. Fillet => Branch Hot Tap Fitting Repair Sleeve Other _____
- 19. Pipe Seam => LF ERW DSAW Seamless Flash Weld Other _____
HF ERW SAW Spiral



Complete a-g if you indicate **any** cause in part H5.

- a. Type of failure:
 - Construction Defect => Poor Workmanship Procedure not followed Poor Construction Procedures
 - Material Defect
- b. Was failure due to pipe damage sustained in transportation to the construction or fabrication site? Yes No
- c. Was part which leaked pressure tested before accident occurred? Yes, complete d-g No
- d. Date of test: _____ / yr. _____ / mo. _____ / day
- e. Test medium: Water Inert Gas Other _____
- f. Time held at test pressure: _____ / hr.
- g. Estimated test pressure at point of accident: _____ PSIG

H6 – EQUIPMENT

- 20. Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment => Control-valve Instrumentation SCADA Communications
Block valve Relief valve Power failure Other _____
- 21. Threads Stripped, Broken Pipe Coupling => Nipples Valve Threads Dresser Couplings Other _____
- 22. Seal Failure => Gasket O-Ring Seal/Pump Packing Other _____

H7 – INCORRECT OPERATION

- 23. Incorrect Operation
 - a. Type: Inadequate Procedures Inadequate Safety Practices Failure to Follow Procedures
Other _____
 - b. Number of employees involved who failed a post-accident test: drug test: _____ / alcohol test: _____ /

H8 – OTHER

- 24. Miscellaneous, describe: _____
- 25. Unknown
Investigation Complete Still Under Investigation (submit a supplemental report when investigation is complete)

PART I – NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT

(Attach additional sheets as necessary)

Blank area for narrative description of factors contributing to the event.

NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER 1-800-424-8802
 *** For Public Use ***
 Information released to a third party shall comply with any applicable federal and/or state Freedom of Information and Privacy Laws

Incident Report # 773011

INCIDENT DESCRIPTION

*Report taken at 16:32 on 19-SEP-05
 Incident Type: PIPELINE
 Incident Cause: UNKNOWN
 Affected Area:
 The incident occurred on 18-SEP-05 at 22:50 local time.
 Affected Medium: AIR ATMOSPHERE

SUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY

Organization: TEXAS EASTERN PRODUCTS PIPELINE CO
 HOUSTON, TX 77252
 Type of Organization: PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

INCIDENT LOCATION

3590 YANKEE ROAD County: BUTLER
 City: MONROE State: OH

RELEASED MATERIAL(S)

CHRIS Code: PRP Official Material Name: PROPANE
 Also Known As:
 Qty Released: 0 UNKNOWN AMOUNT

DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

PROPANE RELEASED FROM TERMINAL PIPING DUE TO UNKNOWN CAUSES, INVESTIGATION UNDERWAY.

INCIDENT DETAILS

Pipeline Type: TRANSMISSION
 DOT Regulated: NO
 Pipeline Above/Below Ground: ABOVE
 Exposed or Under Water: NO
 Pipeline Covered: UNKNOWN

DAMAGES

Fire Involved: YES Fire Extinguished: YES
 INJURIES: NO Hospitalized: Empl/Crew: Passenger:
 FATALITIES: YES Empl/Crew: 1 Passenger: Occupant:
 EVACUATIONS: NO Who Evacuated: Radius/Area:
 Damages: UNKNOWN

<u>Closure Type</u>		<u>Description of Closure</u>	Length of <u>Closure</u>	Direction of <u>Closure</u>	
Air:	N				
Road:	Y	YANKEE ROAD	18	N/S	Major Artery: N
Waterway:	N				
Track:	N				
Passengers Transferred: NO					

Environmental Impact: UNKNOWN
 Media Interest: HIGH Community Impact due to Material: NO

REMEDIAL ACTIONS

SHUT THE TERMINAL DOWN, ASSESSING DAMAGES
 Release Secured: YES
 Release Rate:
 Estimated Release Duration:

WEATHER

Weather: CLEAR, °F Wind direction: S

ADDITIONAL AGENCIES NOTIFIED

Federal:
 State/Local: OH EPA, HAMILTON COUNTY EPA, OSHA
 State/Local On Scene:
 State Agency Number: NO REPORT #

NOTIFICATIONS BY NRC

DOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (PRIMARY)
 19-SEP-05 16:38
 EPA OEM (PRIMARY)
 19-SEP-05 16:42
 U.S. EPA V (PRIMARY)
 19-SEP-05 16:39
 INFO ANALYSIS & INFRA PROTECTION (PRIMARY)
 19-SEP-05 16:38
 NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (PRIMARY)
 19-SEP-05 16:38
 NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORD CTR (INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION)
 19-SEP-05 16:38
 NOAA 1ST CLASS BB RPTS FOR OH (PRIMARY)
 19-SEP-05 16:38
 NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER HQ (PRIMARY)
 19-SEP-05 16:43
 NTSB PIPELINE (PRIMARY)
 19-SEP-05 16:38
 HOMELAND SEC COORDINATION CENTER (PRIMARY)
 19-SEP-05 16:38
 RSPA OFFICE OF PIPELINE SAFETY (PRIMARY)
 19-SEP-05 16:41
 IN DEPT ENV MNGMT ATTN: BEAUCHAMP (PRIMARY)
 19-SEP-05 16:38
 OH EPA ATTN: DUTY OFFICER (PRIMARY)
 19-SEP-05 16:38
 TSA MARITIME AND LAND (PRIMARY)
 19-SEP-05 16:38

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

CALLER STATED THE YANKEE ROAD IS STILL CLOSED.

*** END INCIDENT REPORT # 773011 ***

The National Response Center is strictly an initial report taking agency and does not participate in the investigation or incident response. The NRC receives initial reporting information only and notifies Federal and State On-Scene Coordinators for response. The NRC does not verify nor does it take follow-on incident information. Verification of data and incident response is the sole responsibility of Federal/State On-Scene Coordinators. Data contained within the FOIA Web Database is initial information only. All reports provided via this server are for informational purposes only. Data to be used in legal proceedings must be obtained via written correspondence from the NRC.



All DOL OSHA Advanced Search
SEARCH

A to Z Index | En Español | Contact Us | FAQs | About OSHA

OSHA

OSHA QuickTakes

Newsletter

RSS Feeds

Print This Page

Text Size

Occupational Safety & Health Administration

We Can Help

What's New | Offices

Home

Workers

Regulations

Enforcement

Data & Statistics

Training

Publications

Newsroom

Small
Business



OSHA News Release - (Archived) Table of Contents

OSHA ARCHIVE

NOTICE: This is an OSHA Archive Document, and may no longer represent OSHA Policy. It is presented here as historical content, for research and review purposes only.

OSHA Regional News Release

**U.S. Department of Labor
Office of Public Affairs**

Region 5

Region 5 News Release: 06-333-chi

Date: March 20, 2006

Contact: Brad Mitchell

Phone: 312-353-6976

OSHA Proposes \$173,000 Fine at Todhunter Terminal, Monroe, Ohio, for Violations of Federal Workplace Safety Regulations

CINCINNATI -- The U.S. Labor Department's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has proposed \$173,000 in fines against TEPPCO Partners LP and EPCO Inc. and their successors, for unsafe operation of the Todhunter Terminal, a Monroe, Ohio, facility primarily operating to receive, store, distribute and ship refined petroleum products.

OSHA opened an accident investigation at Todhunter Terminal following a September 2005 explosion that took the life of one worker. As a result of that inspection, OSHA issued citations alleging 15 serious violations with penalties totaling \$103,000 and two repeat violations with \$70,000 in proposed penalties for failure to comply with federal workplace safety and health standards.

Among the serious violations cited were inadequate standard operating procedures for handling propane gas, lack of self-closing valves, lack of training for employees, and use of radio-phones that were not intrinsically safe in hazardous locations. Alleged repeat violations included failure to perform inspections and tests on equipment that controlled the flow of water and propane, lack of written mechanical integrity procedures and failure to correct items found during mandated internal compliance audits of the facility.

"Working with flammable gases requires specialized equipment and procedures," said OSHA Area Director Richard Gilgrist, Cincinnati. "When those elements are lacking, tragedies can and do occur."

OSHA last inspected the Todhunter Terminal following a 2002 accident in which a worker was fatally overcome by butane fumes. TEPPCO Partners is headquartered in Houston, Texas, as the Texas Eastern Products Pipeline Company LLC. The company has 15 working days from receipt of the citations to appeal before the independent Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.

Employers are responsible for providing a safe and healthful workplace for their employees. OSHA's role is to assure the safety and health of America's workers by setting and enforcing standards; providing training, outreach, and education; establishing partnerships; and encouraging continual improvement in workplace safety and health. For more information, visit www.osha.gov.

###

U.S. Labor Department (DOL) releases are accessible on the Internet at www.dol.gov. The information in this news release will be made available in alternate format upon request (large print, Braille, audio tape or disc) from the COAST office. Please specify which news release when placing your request. Call (202) 693-7773 or TTY (202) 693-7755. The U.S. Department of Labor is committed to providing America's employers and employees with easy access to understandable information on how to comply with its laws and regulations. For more information, please visit www.dol.gov/compliance.

OSHA ARCHIVE

NOTICE: This is an OSHA Archive Document, and may no longer represent OSHA Policy. It is presented here as historical content, for research and review purposes only.

[← OSHA News Release - \(Archived\) Table of Contents](#)

[Freedom of Information Act](#) | [Privacy & Security Statement](#) | [Disclaimers](#) | [Customer Survey](#) | [Important Web Site Notices](#) | [International](#) | [Contact Us](#)

U.S. Department of Labor | Occupational Safety & Health Administration | 200 Constitution Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20210
Telephone: 800-321-OSHA (6742) | TTY: 877-889-5627

www.OSHA.gov